Thursday, February 21, 2008

Reed to buy ChoicePoint, sell info division

(Reuters) - Reed Elsevier announced the acquisition of U.S. risk-management business ChoicePoint Inc for $4.1 billion including debt alongside its results, as well as a renewed cost-savings drive and the planned sale of an advertising-dependent information business.

Shares in Anglo-Dutch publisher Reed, which have outperformed the DJ Stoxx European media sector by 5 percent over the past year, jumped 6 percent to 619 pence on the news on Thursday.

The $4.1 billion for ChoicePoint comprises $3.5 billion in cash for the equity, at $50 per share, and 600 million pounds in debt. CheckPoint shares closed at $33.66 on Wednesday.

Reed said that combining ChoicePoint with its LexisNexis risk-information and its Analytics group would create a risk-management business with $1.5 billion in revenue and a leading position in a fast-growing market.

The London-based company said buying ChoicePoint had the unanimous backing of the U.S. company's board and now required shareholder and regulatory approval. ChoicePoint is based in Alpharetta, Ga. and employs around 5,500 people.

Reed also announced that it would divest its Reed Business Information (RBI) arm to reduce its exposure to cyclical advertising markets. The Reed exhibitions business will be kept.

Advertising accounts for around 60 percent of revenues at RBI, which itself generates around 20 percent of Reed's 4.6 billion pound group revenues.
 

Dresdner Rescues $19 Billion SIV, Follows Citigroup

 (Bloomberg) -- Dresdner Bank AG, Germany's third- largest bank, agreed to rescue its $18.8 billion structured investment vehicle, joining Citigroup Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc in bailing out funds crippled by the collapse of the subprime mortgage market.

Dresdner, a unit of Munich-based Allianz SE, will provide a credit line to enable the K2 fund to repay all of its senior debt, spokesman Ulrich Porwollik in Frankfurt said in a telephone interview. Dresdner will cut the size of the fund, which has been reduced from $31.2 billion since July, according to an e-mailed statement.

The bank is the last of the world's biggest financial institutions to put capital at risk salvaging a SIV from the seven-month freeze in credit markets. Banks including Citigroup, HSBC, Bank of Montreal and WestLB AG have disclosed plans to support their SIVs with $140 billion of assets.

``This is a potential threat to Dresdner Bank,'' said Thilo Mueller, managing director of MB Fund Advisory in Frankfurt. ``There is little liquidity for some of these assets and with comparative assets continuing to fall, you need to book further writedowns.''

SIVs, which use short-term borrowing to buy higher-yielding assets, have shrunk by $100 billion from $400 billion since August, according to Moody's Investors Service.

Exit Plan

``Allianz plans to exit K2 and the SIV business in general,'' Chief Financial Officer Helmut Perlet said today in an interview. ``The SIV business has no future.''

The fund, which Allianz expects will be wound down by year- end, is unlikely to cause a ``major negative hit'' if the assets are taken on to Dresdner's books because the company has the ``financial strength to sit out parts of the valuation declines,'' Perlet said.

Allianz's banking division, which is mostly Dresdner, wrote down more than 1.3 billion euros ($1.9 billion) on structured investment products, contributing to a 52 percent decline in fourth-quarter profit announced today. Europe's biggest insurer earned 665 million euros, missing the 729 million-euro median estimate of 12 analysts surveyed by Bloomberg.

Allianz, which has fallen 19 percent this year, rose 1.91 euros, or 1.61 percent, to 120.27 euros at 4:25 p.m. in Frankfurt trading.

No Subprime

K2, named after the world's second-highest mountain in the Himalayas, was started in 1999 by Paul Clarke and Alan Harley, who previously helped manage Europe's first SIVs at Citigroup.

The fund has no ``direct exposure'' to securities backed by subprime or midprime debt, the mortgages made to U.S. homeowners with poor or limited credit histories. K2 also doesn't contain collateralized debt obligations based on asset-backed notes, the statement said. CDOs are securities packaged from mortgage bonds and other assets.

One of the SIV's three portfolios has entered a ``restricted operating period,'' a rule designed to protect senior investors that prevents it making payments to lower- ranking bondholders. The credit line from Dresdner may enable K2 to end the restriction, K2 said in a separate statement today.

``Such an outcome, however, cannot be assured,'' the statement said. K2 didn't disclose the size of the portfolio.

SIV Defaults

The SIV bailouts avert the risk of forced sales of assets by the funds. Concern that fire sales by SIVs would further roil credit markets prompted U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to begin talks on setting up an $80 billion rescue fund last year. Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase & Co. in New York and Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America Corp. abandoned the so- called SuperSIV after banks began rescuing their own funds, led by London-based HSBC.

More than $20 billion of SIVs have defaulted after being forced to start winding down since August, including funds set up by New York-based Ceres Capital Partners LLC and Cheyne Capital Management (UK) LLP in London.

Whistlejacket Capital Ltd., set up by Standard Chartered Plc, may default today after the company's receiver, Deloitte & Touche LLP, froze debts last week. The London-based bank abandoned a rescue plan for SIV yesterday, prompting Moody's to downgrade Whistlejacket's senior debt rating by three steps to B2, five levels below investment grade.

``It's a positive signal that Dresdner is willing to step in and support its SIV, but the story is far from resolved as we saw with Standard Chartered's Whistlejacket SIV,'' said Henry Tabe, an analyst at Moody's in London. Moody's rates K2's senior debt at Aaa.
 

Auction Debt Succumbs to Bid-Rig Taint as Citi Flees

(Bloomberg) -- The collapse of the auction-rate bond market, where state and local governments go to raise cash, demonstrates that regulators are no match for Wall Street.

Hundreds of auctions have failed this month, sending borrowing costs as high as 20 percent because dealers from Goldman Sachs Group Inc. to Citigroup Inc., UBS AG and Merrill Lynch & Co. stopped using their own capital to support the sales. Regulators, who allowed the manipulation of bids and lack of information to persist even after two probes in the past 15 years, are now watching a $342 billion market evaporate at the expense of taxpayers.

Inadequate disclosure ``may have masked the impact of broker-dealer bidding on rates and liquidity,'' Martha Haines, head of the Securities and Exchange Commission's municipal office, said in an interview. ``The large numbers of recent auction failures, which are reported to have occurred due to a reduction in bidding by broker-dealers, appears to indicate those concerns were well founded.''

Citizens Property Insurance of Tallahassee, Florida, a state-run insurer that protects homeowners against hurricane losses, is a casualty. The rate Citizens pays on a portion of the $4.75 billion in securities it has sold jumped to 15 percent from 5 percent at an auction run by UBS that failed on Feb. 13.

No `Backstop'

``The banks were the backstop,'' said Sharon Binnun, the chief financial officer of Citizens. ``If you had more sell orders than buy orders, they'd pick up the difference and you wouldn't have a failed auction.''

Officials at Goldman, Citigroup, UBS and Merrill declined to comment. All the firms are based in New York, except UBS, which is located in Zurich. UBS told its brokers this month that it won't buy bonds that fail to attract enough bidders, and Merrill said it was reducing its purchases.

Auction-rate securities are long-term bonds whose interest resets every seven, 28 or 35 days at bidding run by a dealer who collects a fee of about 25 basis points. Unlike Treasuries or stocks, there is no daily source of information about auction- rate bonds. Issuers have relied on banks to be buyers of last resort when bidders couldn't be found at their auctions.

Since the first of the securities were sold in 1984 for American Express Co., the market has expanded as investors sought the bonds as a higher-yielding alternative to money funds.

SEC Fines

Along the way, New York-based Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. was fined $850,000 in 1995 by the SEC for manipulating auctions conducted for American Express. Almost two years ago, 15 securities firms paid the SEC $13 million to settle claims of bid-rigging in auction-rate bonds. The banks neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing.

While the SEC required dealers to disclose that they may use insider knowledge to place bids, they don't have to say how frequently they bid or how much. Dealers also aren't obligated to disclose rates on auction debt when the securities trade.

The settlement didn't go far enough because it still deprives investors of information they need to make informed bids, said Joseph Fichera, chief executive of Saber Partners LLC, an advisory firm in New York.

``Investors aren't sure they can sell the bonds when they want,'' Fichera said.

Aside from the fines, the market worked smoothly until November, when investors began pulling back from all except the safest of government debt as losses on securities tied to subprime mortgages began infecting other parts of the credit market.

Subprime Contagion

Wall Street firms, reeling from $146 billion in losses on their debt holdings, became unwilling to commit their own capital to support auctions that don't attract enough bidders.

``It's more a liquidity issue, I don't think there's a concern here about these entities being able to repay their debts,'' said Tony Crescenzi, chief bond-market strategist in New York at Miller Tabak & Co., in an interview today with Bloomberg Radio. ``These auction-rate securities are proving to no longer be viable, and we'll see them diminish in scope and size as we go forward.''

A month ago, it was ``unthinkable'' that the banks wouldn't intervene to support auctions, said Steven Brooks, executive director of the North Carolina State Education Assistance Agency. ``I had certainly hoped and believed that that liquidity was there and was an important part of why this marketplace was good for investors and good for issuers.''

From 1984 through 2006, only 13 auctions failed, typically because of changes in the credit of the borrower, according to Moody's Investors Service. There were 31 failures in the second half of 2007, and 32 during a two-week period beginning in January.

`Ugly' Market

``It's ugly,'' said Luis I. Alfaro-Martinez, finance director for the Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, which saw the rate it pays on $62 million of debt rise to the maximum of 12 percent set out in documents governing the bonds, from 4 percent at a Feb. 12 auction handled by Goldman. ``It's getting uglier.''

The average rate for seven-day municipal auction bonds rose to a record 6.59 percent on Feb. 13 from 4.03 percent the previous week, according to indexes compiled by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.

The higher rates drove California, the biggest borrower in the municipal bond market, to decide to replace $1.25 billion of auction-rate bonds with traditional debt.